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Abstract 
The occurrence of impact events (e.g. blackouts with vast geographic coverage) into electrical critic infrastructure systems usually require 
the analysis of cascade failure root causes through the conduction of structural vulnerability studies, with well-defined methodologies that 
may guide decision-making for the implementation of prevention actions and for operation recovery of the power system (e.g. N-1 and N-
t contingency studies). This technical contribution provides some alternative techniques based upon complex networks and graph theory, 
which in the last few years, have been proposed as useful methodologies for analysis of physical behavior of electric power systems. 
Vulnerability assessment is achieved by testing their performance into random risks and deliberate attack threat scenarios. Results shown 
in this proposal lead to conclusions on the use of complex networks for contingency analysis by means of studies of those events that result 
in cascade failures and consumer disconnections. 
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Representación de los sistemas eléctricos de potencia mediante redes 
complejas con aplicación a la evaluación de vulnerabilidad de riesgos 
 
Resumen 
La ocurrencia de eventos de alto impacto (e.g., apagón con alcance geográfico) en sistemas eléctricos usualmente se diagnostica a través 
de técnicas de análisis estructural de vulnerabilidad, constituidas por metodologías definidas que permiten guiar la toma de decisiones en 
acciones de prevención y recuperación de la normalidad en la red (e.g., contingencias N-1 y N-t). En esta contribución técnica se presenta 
una metodología alternativa frente a las herramientas clásicas de análisis de contingencias (teoría de grafos), que últimamente se ha validado 
como método útil en el análisis físico de sistemas de potencia. Se realiza una valoración de la vulnerabilidad en redes de prueba IEEE, 
mediante cuantificación de su comportamiento ante escenarios de riesgos de tipo aleatorio o de ataques deliberados. Estos resultados 
permiten concluir la viabilidad de redes complejas para análisis de contingencias, mediante el estudio de eventos desencadenantes de fallos 
en cascada y desconexión de consumidores. 
 
Palabras clave: protección de infraestructura crítica; análisis de vulnerabilidad; fallos en cascada; seguridad nacional; análisis de riegos. 
 
 
 
1.  Introduction 
 
Critical infrastructure is described by many governments 
as the whole set of assets that are essential for the functioning 
of a society and its economy. In recent years, the European 
Commission (EC), the United States (US) Department of 
Homeland Security, and others have been concerned about 
the security of their country infrastructure. The Council of the 
European Union adopted Directive 114/08/EC in 2008 [1], 
giving rise to the European Program for Critical 
Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP). In 2009, the US National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) was launched and later 
updated in 2013 as an effort to guide decision-making under 
threat scenarios [2]. Such protection plans can be framed as 
a risk management plan involving six steps: establishing 
safety goals, identification of resources, risk assessment, 
prioritization of actions, implementation of protection 
programs, and measuring of their effectiveness [3,4]. 
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Power systems have always been regarded as one of the 
most important critical infrastructures in relation to social, 
economic and military issues in a country. In order to 
analyze the electric system’s vulnerability to threats, some 
new concepts have arisen in an attempt to describe the grid 
performance [5]. The resilience concept suggests that a 
system can adapt to reach a new stable position, after 
suffering a disturbance or contingency in one or more of its 
elements. Additionally, robustness implies that the system 
will operate its undamaged infrastructure, despite being 
exposed to perturbations [5]. Therefore, a robust and 
resilient network is equivalent to a low vulnerability 
network. 
In order to evaluate the stated vulnerability, it is 
important to point out the importance of threat 
quantification required by NIPP’s steps of identification 
and assessment. Therefore, it is possible to determine high-
impact incidents that may lead to cascade failure events into 
critical infrastructures, in this case, electric power systems. 
Such studies, usually referred to as Structural Vulnerability 
Analysis [6], provide important data about the performance 
of the power grid when exposed to perturbations and 
disruptions, requiring suitable methodologies to precise 
detection of anomalies and perturbations in power systems 
[6]. Among these techniques, N-1 and N-t contingency 
studies [7-9] are the most used criteria in the power 
industry.  
On the other hand, the first definition of scale-free 
networks compared the infrastructure systems to complex 
networks [10-13]. Ever since then, graph theory has 
provided a new perspective on the study of power systems. 
Furthermore, concepts of resilience and robustness in scale-
free networks have been applied to both power grids and 
computer networks [12]. They have proved to be a good 
approach to understanding the grid’s dynamic behaviors 
that generally lead to cascade effect failures. As a result, 
when applied to power systems, structural vulnerability 
analysis focuses on the performance of complex networks 
when they’re exposed to disruptions, either randomly 
(tolerance against errors or faults) or deliberately 
(tolerance against attacks) [12,14,15]. 
The way the nodes are removed from a scale-free 
network depends on graph statistical measures. Some 
studies suggest node removal according to their degree of 
connection [7,14,16-18]. Other studies suggest node 
removal based on their betweenness [19-21]. Besides, 
considering random node removals or degree-based node 
attacks, some authors also propose recalculation of degree 
distribution at each iteration, after every node disruption 
[7,19]. 
In this technical contribution, authors show the 
usefulness of scale-free graph measures as an accurate tool 
to assess the vulnerability of power transmission grids. This 
is undertaken by comparing operational indexes in 
traditional AC electric power flow measurements versus 
scale-free graph indexes, by assessing vulnerability to both 
deliberate attack and random error network tolerance. This 
shows the validation of a faster method than AC power 
flow, as it is graph theory modeling, and provides 
acceptable results for understanding the complex nature of 
electric critical infrastructure and their response against 
threats that may disrupt the normal operation of the power 
grid. 
The paper has the following arrangement: Section 2 
introduces scale-free graphs and their equivalence for power 
electric systems, and Section 3 describes appropriate indexes 
to quantify vulnerability in power grid disruptions. Section 4 
proposes an algorithm for risk scenarios of random error and 
deliberate attack vulnerability assessment on the basis of 
illustrative examples based upon IEEE test power networks, 
using N-1 contingency analysis and N-t dynamic simulation 
model for cascade failure events. Section 5 shows the results 
of the proposed model on selected IEEE testing networks (14, 
30, 300 bus). Discussion and conclusions on practical 
applicability of scale-free graph modeling under risk 
scenarios is also provided at the end of the paper. 
The purpose of the technical contribution focuses on the 
comparison of the relative vulnerability between networks. 
This is very useful to guide decision-making concerning the 
effectiveness and impact of expansion plans, e.g., providing 
greater robustness to the electric network (improvement of 
the mesh and higher degree of connectivity of buses) and 
their responses in both random risk scenarios and intentional 
attack threats.  
 
2.  Topology representation in power networks 
 
The fields of application of graph theory, also known as 
complex network theory [22], are characterized by the fact 
that they make it easy to perform an abstract representation 
of a system as a network topology with statistical measures. 
This leads to evaluate the effects of the changes in topology 
on the robustness of the system when subjected to different 
types of attacks and failures. 
Electric power networks resemble scale-free graphs [10], 
which enable the representation of most of the assets that 
conform the power grid. Such representation may be simplified 
as a complex network where substations are specified as nodes 
and electric lines are sketched as links [7,8,12,15,18-20]. In 
those cases, it is easy to calculate cluster measures (triangles) in 
order to determine the graph vulnerability [12]. 
The herein proposed representation looks for a topology 
where both transformers and electric towers are also taken 
into account as assets susceptible to be removed due to 
attacks or errors in the power grid. Figure 1 shows the 
proposed topological representation of a 14-bus electric 
network, compared to the traditional representation (which 
only considers buses and links). Thus, the resulting IEEE 14-
bus network is constituted by a graph of 50 nodes and 56 
links. This way, it is possible to provide a more realistic 
sketch of the power system as a scale-free graph, where the 
set of towers that hold power lines as well as the set of 
transformers are considered as nodes in the graph [26].  
Such representation is very useful when assessing random 
error related risks, since randomly disruption of any node, 
may relate to one of low connectivity degree. In statistical 
terms, those nodes with less connectivity are the most likely 
to disrupt [12,18,23,24]. 
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a) Traditional Electric Model 
b) Traditional Topologic 
Model 
c) Proposed Topologic Model 
Figure 1. Representation of a power electric grid as scale-free graph (IEEE 14-bus)  
Source: [15] 
 
3.  Definitions on indexes for topological representation 
of the power network  
 
Representation of power systems as scale-free networks 
has been well documented [7,23,24]. As previously exposed 
in Section 2, the topological sketch of an electric power grid 
would consist of a set of assets such as transmission lines and 
cables representing graph edges, whereas substations, 
transformers, generators, loads and electric towers represent 
graph nodes [12,15].  
Mathematically, a graph corresponds to an adjacency 
matrix composed by a pair of sets G = (N, E), where N(G) is 
the set of nodes and E(G) is the set of edges. An edge 
corresponds to a connection between pairs of nodes with the 
form (i, j) such that i, j  E. The link (i, j) is denoted as ij. An 
edge connecting two nodes denotes Gij= 1 (corresponding to the location of a pair of nodes) and Gij = 0 otherwise [5,7,20]. Studying the properties of a graph leads to the analysis of 
the adjacency matrix properties [25]. The nodal degree (ki) is the set of converging edges (Ei) to a particular node (Ni):   
ki = |Ni| (1) 
 
where: 
 
Ni = {j  N | {i; j}  E} (2) 
 
In order to illustrate this definition, please refer to 
generators and loads that are connected through a single link 
to the power grid, meaning that their nodal degree is k = 1. 
The definitions in (1) and (2) constitute the basis to 
determine statistical measures of the scale-free graph (i.e. 
their robustness and their connectivity). It is important to 
point out that scale-free graph representation implies that few 
nodes are highly connected. This means that such nodes have 
a larger number of edges compared to other nodes, even 
though the degree of connection throughout the scale-free 
graph is quite low. Such graphs are closer to reality, since the 
network will grow preferentially based on the nodes of 
greater connectivity [10,16], as happens in real 
infrastructures. A more detailed explanation on this 
characterization may be consulted in [3,7,12,15]. 
 
3.1.  Graph’s geodesic distance (d) 
 
Based on the analysis of the scale-free graph adjacency 
matrix G = (N, E), it is possible to determine inferences on 
the evolution of the network when it is exposed to successive 
node removal (disintegration of the network). These statistic 
measures lead to the construction of indexes that reveal an 
equivalence between power load shedding and graph 
disintegration [7,12,15]. 
Graph geodesic distance dij describes how compact a 
network is. The shortest geodesic distance between two 
nodes dij is calculated by counting the minimum number of nodes in the path between a pair of nodes i and j [25]. The 
graph average distanced is determined as a function of the 
network’s geodesic distance dij and the total number of nodes 
N [19], as shown in Eq. (3): 
 
  ji ijdNNd 1
1  (3) 
 
Calculation of the geodesic distances in (3) may be 
performed through Dijkstra, Bellman-Ford, Floyd-Warshall 
and Johnson algorithms [25] that are well documented in 
literature. 
The following definitions relate to the analysis of the 
adjacency matrix G = (N, E) of a scale-free graph. The graph 
evolves as it is exposed to disintegration due to node 
disruptions (cascade failure evolution).  
Trafo 4
Trafo 3Trafo 2
Trafo 1
Linea 9
Linea 8
Linea 7
Linea 6Linea 5
Linea 4
Linea 3
Linea 2
Linea 16
Linea 15
Linea 14
Linea 13
Linea 12Linea 11
Linea 10
Linea 1
G2
G1
Capacit 3
Capacit 2
Capacit 1
C9C8
C7
C6
C5
C4
C3
C2
C11 C10
C1
Bus 14
Bus 13
Bus 12
Bus 11
Bus 10
Bus 09
Bus 08
Bus 07
Bus 06
Bus 05
Bus 04
Bus 03
Bus 02
Bus 01
Correa-Henao & Yusta-Loyo / DYNA 82 (192), pp. 68-77. August, 2015. 
71 
3.2.  Network connectivity (K) 
 
The connectivity of network K is determined in any graph 
representing the power grid by counting the amount of nodes that 
are connected to a scale-free graph [22], as shown in Eq. (4): 
 
N
NK
LC
1  (4) 
 
NLC: amount of nodes connected on the remaining scale-
free graph, after a node disruption under contingency events. 
N: Base-case: total amount of nodes in the original scale-
free graph  
 
3.3.  Geodesic strength (gs) 
 
From Eq. (3) the Average Efficiency (e) is formulated as 
[21]: 
 
  ji ijdNNe
1
1
1  (5) 
 
Index eij is usually calculated as the inverse of geodesic distances, and it allows the quantification about how efficiently 
flows can be exchanged within a network. If there were no 
connection between two nodes: dij   , eij = 0 [15, 17,24]. From Eq. (5), we define the geodesic strength gs as a 
parameter that measures the functionality of a network when 
exposed to node disruptions. Index in Eq. (6) standardizes 
geodesic efficiency as formulated by [17,26,27] and enables 
vulnerability assessments into a network due to effects of 
iterative cascade failure events [10]. 
 













ji
BC
ij
ji
LC
ij
d
d
gs 1
1
 (6) 
 
dij LC: shortest path between a pair of nodes of the scale-
free graph, after a node disruption under contingency events. 
dij BC: Base-case: shortest path between a pair of nodes in the original scale-free graph 
Indexgs in (6) varies between one and zero. The lower 
strength index valuegs, the greater impact on the graph. It 
describes flow bottlenecks into the network as some geodesic 
paths are disrupted. This is equivalent to a power grid 
fragmentation due to isolation of power loads into the system. 
Consequently, it is possible to substitute onerous 
computational techniques (e.g. power flow routines) with 
more efficient procedures (e.g. graph theory statistics) in 
order to perform structural vulnerability analysis, depending 
on the incidents that trigger cascade failure events [10].  
The convenience of merging power flow models and 
scale-free graph statistics has been previously demonstrated 
in [12,15,16] through the calculation of the responses in 
different IEEE networks. This is performed by contrasting 
the results of traditional electrical engineering parameters, 
referred to as a portion of disconnected loads or power load 
shedding [28-31], with geodesic strength gs, and thus 
allowing comparisons between different power systems to 
determine the most vulnerable. This validation implies an 
important advantage when combining traditional 
methodologies of electric power flows and graph theory 
statistics in order to study perturbations, disruptions and 
black-out events [12].  
 
3.4.  Power grid load (PGL) 
 
Even though structural vulnerability analysis can be 
achieved by calculating evolution of indexes in Eq. (4) and 
(6), it is not clear that this evaluation method may be reliable, 
since electric parameters of the power grid are not involved 
in these calculations. Therefore, traditional power flow 
parameters need to be considered in order to compare the 
effectiveness of graph theory indexes.  
Power flow indexes documented in literature are mainly 
used to determine the impact of N1 contingencies in the 
power grid: Maximum Load Conditions [9], Comprehensive 
Information System, Power System Loss [31], and Index of 
Severity [8]. A good measure of functionality for the power 
grid network would be the consumer loads that remain 
connected to the electrical service after a disruption event. An 
intuitive power flow index to understand evolution of 
cascade failure events corresponds to Power Grid Load 
(PGL), which is also useful to quantify the load shedding 
condition in a power grid, as proposed in [9,28,31].  
 
    
    




i
BC
Di
BC
Di
i
LC
Di
LC
Di
QP
QP
PGL 22
22
 (7) 
 
PDiLC: active power load that remains electrically connected, after a node disruption under contingency events. 
QDiLC: reactive power load that remains electrically 
connected, after a node disruption under contingency events. 
PDiBC: Base-case: Total active power load in testing network. 
QDiBC: Base-case: Total reactive power load in testing network. 
PGL in Eq. (7) is calculated as a percentage of the load 
that keeps connected to the remaining electric grid at each 
node removal iteration, in order to avoid cascade outage. Its 
range varies between zero and one. The higher PGL index 
value, the lower impact on non-supplied energy. 
PGL in Eq. (7) is computed by means of Standard Power 
Flow (SPF) routine [30] (corresponding to nonlinear equations 
that are solved iteratively using Newton’s Method [8,9]). 
 
3.5.  Severity index (S.I) 
 
Even though Severity Index (S.I.) is well documented for 
N1 contingency analysis [8], the index might be useful for 
measuring in cascade failure events, as quoted in technical 
studies [9, 28]. The Severity Index is referred to as a common 
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method of contingency analysis based on power flow 
methodologies in order to establish the load level of both 
lines and transformers after a certain incident event. Severity 
Index is defined as follows [8]: 
 

 





N
i
BC
Di
LC
Di
P
P
N
IS
1
1.  (8) 
 
PDiLC: active power load that remains electrically 
connected, after a node disruption under contingency events. 
N: Base-case: total number of nodes representing 
substations, lines, and transformers in the scale-free graph. 
PDiBC: Base-case: Total active power load in testing network 
 
4.  Algorithm design for vulnerability assessment on the 
power grid under risk scenarios 
 
This section explains the procedure for computational 
analysis, considering a first approach through N-1 contingency 
analysis and extending it to random errors and deliberate attacks 
tolerance with an N-t dynamic cascade failure simulation model. 
Even though the disruption strategies are explained in detail in 
Section 5, it is worth mentioning that Deliberate Attacks node 
removal means that the most connected nodes are removed at 
each contingency event. 
 
4.1.  N-1 contingency analysis model and n-t dynamic failure 
model simulation 
 
Cascade failure events resembles a graph disintegration, 
taking first into account the estimation of the parameters from 
a power grid that operates under steady state conditions (base 
case) [12]. Such cascade failure events are determined by the 
interdiction of network’s nodes according to certain removal 
strategies. A node disruption implies the elimination of all 
edges connected to it and therefore, its corresponding 
connected links also disappear. A first approach to determine 
the most critical assets on the power grid consists in N-1 
contingency analysis. The results provide information about 
the nodes that require the most important attention in terms 
of their protection, due to the effects exerted on them 
throughout the network when they are interdicted from the 
system [9].  
The described technique can be extended to a dynamic 
simulation model, which is equivalent to successive 
contingency N-1 and N-t iterations over a constantly 
changing topology structure. Since power flows can only be 
performed based upon the existence of the reference (slack) 
bus generator, removal of nodes is handled around the 
reference slack generator bus (this means that the slack 
generator must always be present in the network and cannot 
be removed). The algorithm has been designed to measure 
parameters only with components that remain connected to 
the network as it disintegrates. Generator outages are 
considered in random failure routines, since generators are 
treated as nodes in the scale-free graph that may be subject to 
disruptions.  
The proposed N-t cascade failure dynamic model takes 
into account two different scenarios in which multiple 
samplings are performed for random error phenomena, 
unlike deliberate attacks that run only one sample [12]. Since 
error distribution is highly asymmetric in N-t analysis, we 
propose taking the suggestion of the Central Limit Theorem, 
implying the normal distribution of data for a sufficiently 
large number of independent random values. Such 
approximation is good enough when more than 30 samples 
are collected [25]. 
The described algorithm has been implemented in 
Matlab®. Its programming takes into account power flow 
algorithms provided by PSAT (Power System Analysis 
Toolbox) [30]. Furthermore, the script incorporates features 
of MatlabBGL graph theory toolbox [31]. Geodesic distances 
dij in Eq. (3) are calculated according to Bellman-Ford shortest-paths algorithm [25]. 
 
4.2.  Algorithm implementation and processing time 
 
Realistic scenarios have been applied in order to 
prove the usefulness of graph theory models, especially 
for N-t contingency analysis. They correspond to IEEE 
Testing Networks of 5, 14, 24, 30, 57, 118 and 300 buses, 
whose iterative processes are shown in Table 1. The data 
can be accessed through flat text files [15]. Table 1 
shows the iterations required to perform the proposed 
dynamic cascade failure model, for N-t contingency 
analysis. 
In N-t contingency analysis, the structure of the network 
has to rearrange constantly, since it is exposed to successive 
node interdictions. This fact may turn out in divergences on 
the power flow results when executing a Standard Power 
Flow (SPF) routine [8]. In cases where the SPF routine does 
not converge, a convenient PSAT feature provides a 
Continuation Power Flow (CPF) routine [31], an efficient 
method for solving ill-conditioned cases.  
The algorithm has been implemented in Matlab®. The 
script completes its execution until it may not be possible 
to disrupt any other node from the network, either 
because all nodes are isolated, or because there are no 
more electric circuits to perform power flows routines. 
The designed algorithm is able to calculate graph theory 
indexes previously defined in Eq. (4), (6) and electric 
power flow indexes previously exposed in Eq. (7), (8). 
Table 1 also shows some relevant statistics that concern 
the simulation of deliberate attacks and random errors on 
IEEE testing networks. Note that the number of iterations 
per sample is greater in random disruptions than node 
degree-based attacks. 
 
5.  Simulation results according to interdiction strategies 
 
The results of the simulation are shown in Figure 2 for N-
1 contingency analysis, whereas Figure 3 shows the results 
for the N-t dynamic model simulation for random error node 
removal strategy, and Fig. 4 for deliberate attack node 
removal strategy.   
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Table 1  
Summary of Iterative Processes for N-t Dynamic Simulation Model on IEEE 
Test Networks 
IEEE 
Network 
( Buses) 
Scale Free 
Graph 
(N° Nodes) 
Disruption 
Strategy Samples 
Iterations 
per Sample
Execution 
Time 
(sec) 
5 16 Random 35 9 125” Deliberate 1 6 10” 
14 50 Random 35 33 2.105” Deliberate 1 10 57” 
24 90 Random 35 62 4.810” Deliberate 1 18 109” 
30 98 Random 35 67 5.423” Deliberate 1 26 122” 
57 186 Random 35 120 34.236” Deliberate 1 42 245” 
118 449 Random 35 293 68.430” Deliberate 1 107 729” 
300 978 Random 35 635 189.256” Deliberate 1 214 1.258” 
Source: The Authors 
 
 
In order to keep the illustrations clear in both figures, the 
results of only three bus networks have been plotted, 
corresponding to IEEE testing networks of 5, 14, 30 and 300 
buses (considered a good representation of the methodology). 
In Figure 2 the x-axis refers to the node name failed on an 
N-1 contingency (unfortunately it is not possible to display 
all of those names). Scales for all indexes are indicated in per-
unit values. The “most critical” nodes may be identified in 
the equivalent scale-free graph of the power grid, by just 
determining the higher values of the I.S parameter, or the 
lowest values of the PGL parameter, related to the node 
disruption. 
 
5.1.  N-1 contingency analysis 
 
The study of N-1 contingency analysis refers to those 
events that occur when a network element is removed or 
taken out of service due to unforeseen circumstances. For 
every grid’s disruption, power flows are redistributed 
throughout the network and voltage bars change. As a result, 
there may be overloaded lines and transformers [7]. 
Figure 2 shows the results for both power grid load index 
(Eq. 7) and severity index (Eq. 8) compared to geodesic 
strength and connectivity index (Eq. 4 and Eq. 6) for N-1 
contingency analysis in IEEE test networks of 5, 14, 30 and 
300 buses. The analysis is performed through the successive 
execution of the Standard Power Flow Newton-Raphson 
algorithm [7,30,31]. As explained in Eq. (7) and Eq. (8) the 
contingency results are compared to the base case, i.e., the 
network operating under normal conditions. Hence, N-1 
contingency analysis allows the identification of the most 
vulnerable nodes in the power network, which is the first step 
for decision-making in critical infrastructure protection. 
Graph theory indexes gs in Eq. (6) and K in Eq. (4) show 
that in all cases the greatest impact on the network occurs 
through the removal or isolation of nodes with a higher 
degree of connectivity, especially buses. However, networks 
with less nodes (such as generators, capacitors and loads) 
have a minimal impact on both connectivity and geodesic 
strength indexes. N-1 contingency analysis provides a more 
realistic scenario when calculating PGL index of Eq. (7), 
since it relates to the power grid operating parameters. The 
most critical nodes may be identified as those whose removal 
leads to the lowest impact on either connectivity or geodesic 
strength. 
In the particular case of the IEEE 30 bus network, made 
up by 98 nodes, the isolation of its generators in either node 
5 or node 42 implies the decoupling of system loads, 
configuring a blackout event that affects almost 30% of the 
power grid. Furthermore, disruption of node 2 may cause a 
significant overload in lines and transformers as implied by 
the quantification of S.I. (43% greater than the base case). In 
the IEEE 300 bus test network, even though there are no 
nodes that lead to a total breakdown, in a few cases (nodes 
54, 166 and 876) the PGL index may decrease down to a 
range of 30% to 50% on the system connected load in the 
power grid. 
 
5.2.  Dynamic N-t model for random error tolerance  
 
A network may become a target in different risk scenarios 
either by deliberate attacks or random errors. This fact can be 
studied assuming that from a connected scale-free graph of N 
nodes, there might be a fraction f of nodes that may be 
removed. This section compares vulnerability results using 
both graph theory indexes and classic power flow indicators, 
in several realistic scenarios. In this section, nodes 
interdiction strategies are related to random perturbations, 
which cause the failure of some other nodes (natural 
disasters, equipment faults, procedure failures). Thus, the 
first mechanism to be studied is the removal of randomly 
selected nodes. The numerical simulations in Figure 3 
indicate that scale-free networks display a topological 
robustness against random node failures (since low degree 
nodes are far more abundant than high degree ones).  
From Figure 3, random error risk scenarios cause a total 
collapse of the network service (blackout) after the removal 
of 20% of the nodes. The PGL index evolution shows that in 
all cases, the IEEE bus test network completely collapses 
with the removal of about 20% of the nodes. The comparison 
between results of graph connectivity index K and PGL in 
Figure 3 show that nodal connectivity is not proportionally 
related to the grid’s electrical condition. This means that the 
PGL electrical index evolves at a different bias rate than the 
impact on connectivity graph index K.  
The use of the average geodesic strength gs index, shown 
in Figure 3, does really facilitate contrasting of results 
between classic electrical parameters and topological 
indicators, since the results of the geodesic strength gs 
match with the forecasts obtained through electric index PGL 
from Eq. (7).  
A graphic comparison between PGL andgs for events of 
random error disruptions (Figure 3) shows that the 300 bus 
test-network is the most vulnerable, followed by 57 and 24 
bus test-networks. 
Severity Index S.I. from Eq. (8) has also been sketched in 
a secondary axis, in order to understand the evolution on 
loading of both transformers and transmission lines, as node  
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Figure 2. N-1 Contingency Analysis in IEEE Test Networks  
Source: The Authors 
 
 
removing takes place during cascade failure events. It can be 
noticed that these elements of the network discharge their 
loads as long as the PGL index evolves in similar trends. One 
interesting observation relates to the remarkable bias on the 
gs index when compared to the S.I parameter. 
 
5.3.  Dynamic N-t model for deliberate attack tolerance 
 
Another realistic risk scenario is given by deliberate 
attacks, consisting of those risks caused by antagonist 
attackers on the power grid, i.e. emulating an intentional 
attack on the network [16]. 
This second removal strategy, in which the most highly 
connected nodes are removed at each contingency event, is 
the most damaging scenario to the integrity of the system 
[32]. In the case of an intentional attack, when the nodes with 
the highest number of edges are targeted, the network breaks 
down faster than in the case of random node removal. 
The PGL index evolution in Fig. 3 shows that, under 
deliberate attacks, the removal of only 1% of the nodes in the 
plotted bus-test networks causes a blackout (100% of loads 
are isolated from the power grid). Furthermore, I.S. evolution 
shows that the loads are quickly discharged from 
transformers and transmission lines.  
This fact demonstrates the reason why scale-free 
networks may be fragile to intentional attacks, since the 
removal of the nodes with higher connectivity has a dramatic 
disruptive effect on the network, and this can be observed in 
Fig. 4. The slight recovery of the I.S parameter when about 
2% of the nodes are removed in both IEEE 5 and IEEE 14 
bus test network is explained by the fact that there is an 
electrically connected circuit around the slack generator, 
which allows the circulation of power flows. 
Taking into account the results shown, the networks are 
completely isolated when removing 2% and 25% of nodes 
respectively at deliberate attacks (Fig. 4) and random error 
(Fig. 3) removal strategies. Results for deliberate attack 
disruptions (Fig. 4) show the existence of a better correlation 
between geodesic strength index gs (5) and PGL parameter 
(7), than network connectivity index K (4). When the 
geodesic strength gs has a value close to zero, this implies a 
greater disintegration of the network, and hence flows 
between generators and loads need to step over more paths. 
 
6.  Discussion 
 
It would be worth determining the dependence among 
electric parameters (PGL, S.I.), relating to graph theory indexes 
(K, gs), so it is possible to estimate the benefit of using the 
mechanisms of graph theory, instead of power transfer capacity 
between generators and loads, in order to perform vulnerability 
analysis. A practical measure to establish such dependence is the 
Pearson correlation coefficient , which is obtained via division 
of the covariance of two variables by the product of their 
standard deviations , as exposed in Eq. (9). 
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Figure 3. Results for graph theory indexes and power flow parameters for random errors in IEEE test networks, after averaging 35 samples in N-t dynamic 
model. Nodes are removed randomly  
Source: The Authors 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Results for graph theory indexes and power flow parameters for deliberate attacks in IEEE test networks in N-t dynamic model. Nodes are removed 
in decreasing degree order  
Source: The Authors 
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 Figure 5. Comparative results of Pearson Coefficients () among electric 
parameters and graph theory indexes for IEEE Test Networks  
Source: The Authors 
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i: Correlation between electric index (PGL, IS) and graph theory index (K, gs) 
Fig. 5 reveals the results for correlations between indexes 
of Eq. (9). 
Note that for random error node removal strategy, the 
Pearson correlation 2 is closer to +1, which implies a 
positive linear relationship between the PGL index and 
geodesic strength gs. According to this comparison, thegs 
parameter would also be useful to determine the 
disconnected electric load PDi out of the power grid during cascade failures events. 
On the other hand, comparison for connectivity index K 
shows lower correlation 1 with electrical index PGL. This means that it should not be considered as a precise indicator to 
assess the vulnerability of electric networks. Therefore, this 
correlation confirms the comparisons of the bias trend between 
index gs (6) and PGL (7) shown in Figure 3 and Fig. 4. 
In deliberate attacks, correlation 2 for parameter gs is 
weaker than 1 for index K. Thus, average geodesic strengthgs is of interest to make comparisons between 
different power systems and determine which one is the most 
vulnerable.  
A final comment relates to the correlation between I.S 
and graph theory indexes (3, 4) that are quite close to +1 
for random disruption strategies in all test networks. This 
means that both parameters may be useful to infer the impact 
on the loadability of the power system. 
Results on Pearson correlations allow an inference on the 
advantage of using graph theory based models, since there 
are faster performances when applied to IEEE test systems 
compared to traditional AC Power Flows. This issue is 
critical in order to recover a power system from a serious 
disturbance such as blackouts, transmission lines outages, 
and terrorist attacks. 
7.  Conclusion 
 
The proposal herein explained allows the comparison of 
numerical indexes of graph theory (K,gs) and power flow 
techniques (PGL, IS) in order to assess vulnerability for any 
power grid. The usefulness of combining scale-free graph 
statistics and power flow model parameters has been 
validated, making it possible to substitute laborious 
computational tools (i.e. classic power flow techniques) with 
more efficient techniques (i.e. graph theory statistics) to 
perform structural vulnerability analysis of any electric 
network, depending on the events that trigger cascade 
failures (random risks or deliberate threats). 
The convenience of N-1 contingency analysis to identify 
the most vulnerable nodes in the power system has been 
validated. This is the first step for decision-making in the 
protection of these assets. It has also been proven that scale-
free graph indexes can be used to qualify the vulnerability of 
a power grid topology compared to another one, especially 
for N-t dynamic cascade failure events. Hence, this feature is 
a great advantage since it is not necessary to run power flow 
routines to compare the vulnerability among different power 
systems. This result also demonstrates the computational 
efficiency of the proposed method. 
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